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P E G B R A N D A N D M Y L E S B R A N D
According to Arthur Danto, interpretations are essential to the identity of an object
as a work of art. In The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art he says: “My theory
of interpretation is . . . constitutive, for an object is an artwork at all only in relation to an
interpretation.”1 Interpretations are transﬁgurative; they are “functions which transform
material objects into works of art.”2 There is no work of art without an interpretation.
But not just any interpretationwill do; transﬁgurative interpretationsmust be “correct”;
that is, they must coincide as closely as possible with the artist’s own description or mental
representation of the work. Artworks are “misconstituted when interpretation is wrong.”3
Correctness and identity are so closely related, in fact, that “knowing the artist’s
interpretation is in effect identifying what he or she has made.”4 Such identiﬁcation is
timebound, “scrupulously historical,” and refers only to possibilities with which the artist
could (or actually does) agree.5 The artist is the privileged authority, the ultimate arbiter.
Determining textual identity of works of art in this way, according toDanto, is so “routine”
that we have become “masters” of it.6 Later in this book, Danto calls this type of
interpretation “surface interpretation.”
There is another type of interpretation that Danto explores, one which he believes we
have notmastered (though not for lack of trying). Deep interpretation is a reading of a work
of art that goes beyond (below) the surface level: it yields understanding below (deeper
than) that which can be realized at the surface level. Whereas interpretation at the surface
level is conﬁrmable by the artist (what she might have meant, must have meant, or would
allow to have meant upon reﬂection), interpretation at the deep level is not so conﬁrmable.
Deep interpretations afford multiple readings of the one same phenomenon, the work of
art, that are alternatives to that obtained at the surface level. Such readings emerge from
within a stipulated conceptual framework; for instance,Marxism, feminism, structuralism,
psychoanalytic theory. Though artists can propose deep interpretations of their own work,
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they are in no special relationship to such readings: their intentions are irrelevant to the
plausibility of the reading proposed. Here they are not the ﬁnal arbiters.
At one point, Danto contrasts stains on an actual wall that have inspired Leonardo to
paint landscape and ﬁgures (for example, the Battle of Anghiari, The Last Supper) and an
imaginary wall with stains that was once a Leonardo painting but has since reverted back to
mere stains. The identities of these frescos are in doubt, of course, until we achieve the
“right sort of knowledge” about them: knowledge about what the artist has done and why.
Ascertaining this knowledge constitutes establishing surface interpretations, thereby
legitimating only the latter as art. Hence, the importance of art history. Any and all deep
interpretations, for instance, a reading of The Last Supper along Freudian lines, depend on
the established identities of the works at surface level. Since “there is no end to deep
interpretation,”7 myriads of deep readings seem to depend unquestioningly upon the one
correct surface interpretation.
As might be presumed, there are interesting relationships between these two levels.
First, surface interpretation is a prerequisite for deep interpretation: “surface interpreta-
tion, when successfully achieved, gives us the interpretanda for deep interpretation, the
interpretatia for which are to be sought in the depths.”8 This relationship derives from
Danto’s earlier claim that interpretation is constitutive of a work of art. Second, deep
interpretation follows upon surface interpretation: “Deep interpretation supposes
surface interpretation to have done its work, so that we know [at the surface level] what
has been done and why.”9 This further relationship stands between the contents of
surface and deep interpretation.
That, in briefest outline, is Danto’s view of surface and deep interpretation in The
Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, a view that complements his previous discussions
on aesthetics.10 Danto is at his best when he is being suggestive and creative; rarely are his
perspectives anything less than insightful. But, starting with the biases of analytic
philosophy, God is to be found in the details. Where Danto hints at clarifying analogies,
reﬂection on them yields improved understanding of his perspective.Where a single thesis
seems to be suggested, several emerge, some more plausible than others. And where the
relationship between surface and deep interpretation is said to be straightforward, it is
actually complex and controversial.
In the next two sections, we detail the analogy between understanding human actions
and interpreting works of art. This analogy both develops a motivation for Danto’s view
and clariﬁes it. In the course of that discussion, we distinguish between alternative
deﬁnitions of “surface interpretation” and “deep interpretation,” as well as the asserted
dependency between these types of interpretation. In the ﬁnal two sections, we object to the
most plausible version of content dependency among surface and deep interpretations. In
doing so, we also clarify the way in which an interpretation is constitutive of an artwork.
1 Analogy with Human Action
Danto draws our attention to the analogy between understanding human actions and
interpreting works of art. Ultimately the analogy is grounded on the fact that creating a
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work of art is an action, often a highly complex, temporally extended action, but an
action nonetheless. Interpreting a work of art, in fact, is a special case of understanding
an agent’s action.
For our purposes, the focal aspects of this analogy are these: (1) a description of an art
object is like an observer’s – a spectator’s – understanding of the mere behavior associated
with an action; (2) the surface interpretation of a work of art is like an agent’s understanding
of his own action; and (3) a deep interpretation of a work of art is like an observer’s
understanding of the consequences of the agent’s action.
We embrace the Causal Theory of Action, according to which a bit of behavior is an
action in virtue of its causal antecedents. These antecedents are representational mental
events, preeminently intentions, but also background beliefs and desires.11 This is a
functional account of action, in that action is speciﬁed in virtue of its causal roles. Consider
some simple or basic action, say Stravinski’s lowering his arm. The story is this:
Stravinski’s lowering his arm is an action in virtue of his mental representational state,
consisting primarily of his intention to lower his arm, causing the bodily behavior of his
arm’s going down.
From an observer’s point of view, all that is seen is the motion of Stravinski’s arm. An
observer does not, literally, see an action, since he can see neither the agent’s intention nor
the causal relation between the intention and the arm’s motion. He infers that Stravinski’s
arm going down was caused by his intention to lower his arm from contextual clues and by
projections from his own actions.
A description of a work of art is like an observer’s understanding of the behavior
associated with an agent’s action. All that is relevant to a description of a work of art are its
physical characteristics. If the work is a painting, then the description consists in citing, for
example, the size of the canvas, the kinds towhich the objects depicted belong (for example,
apples, bowls, ﬁsh) if the painting is realistic, or the colors and shapes if it is nonrepresen-
tational. A description of the painting does not make reference to the artist’s intentions or
any other of the artist’s representational mental events in creating the work. Similarly, in a
literary work, say a novel, a description would cite the main characters, the setting, and the
storyline. The description does not say what the author intends to convey to the reader, nor
what the reader thinks thework conveys. For in those cases, we are going beyond the purely
observational characteristics of the text; we are referencing the author’s or the reader’s
representational states.
If all that we are told about Stravinski’s arm is that it descends at a certain rate in a certain
direction, we have no way to determine whether Stravinski acted. Without information
about his mental state and its connection to his arm’s motion, we are not entitled to claim
that an action took place. Similarly, if we only have descriptive knowledge of the physical
characteristics of a man-made object, we are not entitled to claim that it is a work of art.
Rather, we must also know the intentions of the maker in creating an artwork. Without
these prior intentions playing a crucial causal role, the object is not an artwork. If we label a
statement of the artist’s prior representational mental state “the artist’s intended inter-
pretation,” then the artist’s intended interpretation is constitutive of the artwork in the
same way that Stravinski’s intention to lower his arm is constitutive of his bodily behavior
being an action.
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Suppose now that Stravinski signals to the cellos by lowering his arm. An observer, a
music critic, questions whether at that point in The Firebird, Stravinski was signaling to
the cellos or to the basses. After all, one can signal and that signal not be taken. Stravinski
could have been signaling to the basses, but the cellos responded. How is the critic to
answer this question? It is obvious. Ask Stravinski. No one is – or can be – in a better
position than Stravinski himself to say correctly whether he signaled to the cellos or to the
basses. Stravinski occupies a privileged position as to understanding what he did.
The surface interpretation of a work of art is a statement about what the artist created
based on his or her intentions and other representational states, such as background beliefs
and desires. The surface interpretation of a work of art is, fundamentally, the artist’s
intended interpretation.
Often, the critic must rely on plausible reconstructions of the artist’s intentions in order
to approximate the surface interpretation of thework. Such reconstructions generallymake
use of historical knowledge about the artist, about the social context in which she worked,
about the traditions and conventions in place at the time, and so on. Without access to the
artist’s report of her intentions, and evidence to believe that this report is reliable, the
critic’s reconstruction of the surface interpretation can never be taken as deﬁnitive.
Nonetheless, there is exactly one surface interpretation, though it might never be known,
and that is the correct rendering of the artist’s intentions.
Danto seems to suggest at times that the surface interpretation is more than the artist’s
intended interpretation. Works of art often exhibit ambiguities. Surface interpretation
disambiguates the work in a way that differs minimally from the artist’s intended
interpretation. Understood in this way, there may be more than one surface interpretation
since there may be more than one way to disambiguate a work while being consistent with
the artist’s intentions andmaking onlyminimal additions to them. Indeed, under this view,
there can be in principle indeﬁnitely many such surface interpretations. For there can be
indeﬁnitely many ways to supplement the artist’s interpretation without contradicting her
stated intentions about the work.
Against this view, it might be responded that there is exactly one surface interpretation
and it is precisely the artist’s intended interpretation. We might not know how to
disambiguate the work, but the artist does, even if she fails to report it or even consciously
think about it.
This response presupposes that the artist intends exactly one reading or interpretation
of every aspect of a work of art, and that appears false. Consider Watteau’s painting
L’embarquement a Cythere.Are the lovers entering or leaving the Isle of Love? The work is
ambiguous. It might, importantly, be intentionally ambiguous. Watteau, we can imagine,
never intended, one way or another, whether the lovers were falling in or out of love. He
simply had no intentions at all in this regard. Thus, the artist’s intended interpretation of
the painting would not make reference to this aspect of it.
It is not clear which notion of surface interpretation Danto intends. But in any case,
there is a problem with taking surface interpretation as minimal disambiguation. Ambigu-
ities and unclarities abound in works of art. If we are required to resolve each one, a surface
interpretation will add considerably many claims to the artist’s interpretation. Unless we
are willing to countenance indeﬁnitely many surface interpretations, the question arises
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as to the criteria for ﬁxing sets of disambiguating statements. If a set of disambiguating
judgments is to be coherent, there will be a theoretical perspective from which it is made.
But appealing to a theoretical perspective is to provide a deep, not a surface, interpretation.
That is, once we move beyond the artist’s intended interpretation, there is a slippery slide
toward deep interpretation.Thepreferred approach, and one consistentwith the analogy to
action theory, is to restrict surface interpretations to the artist’s intended interpretations.
Admittedly, there will then be aspects of the work that cannot be interpreted on the surface
level. But that result seems acceptable. In part, it is because surface interpretations are
not complete that deep interpretations are brought to bear.
Consider two painters who create abstract works that are observationally, that is,
descriptively, extraordinarily similar; say, each depicts a large bright red–orange sphere
with a yellow background. The ﬁrst painter indicates that his intention was to illustrate
the blending of oranges, reds, and yellow; it was an exercise in color and composition.
The second painter indicates that his intention was to depict the coming of worldwide
destruction due to man’s misuse of the ecosystem. The second painter’s intentions go well
beyond what can easily be “read” directly from the painting.
Which of these artists has given the correct surface interpretation of his work?Both.The
surface interpretation of a work of art is the interpretation the artist gives to the work in
virtue of his intentions in creating it. The degree to which the work is put into context or
given a symbolic reading, or alternatively the degree to which it approaches a description of
the work as a limit, is irrelevant to the correctness of the surface interpretation. The surface
interpretation is no more than, and no less than, the understanding of the work given the
artist’s intentions, background beliefs, and other representational mental states that played
a role in his creating it.
An artist can fail to have the work express his intentions, or he can misreport his
intentions when reﬂecting on the completed work. The situation is the same for the case of
actions generally. Stravinski might fail to signal to the cellos if they do not take his signal, or
he might misreport his intentions when discussing his action with a critic after the concert.
But if his memory is veridical and he reports truthfully, then what action he performed –
whether he signaled to the cellos or to the basses – is deﬁnitively settled by him. The same
holds for our two artists. The art critic may have reason to believe that, for instance, the
second artist was offering a post hoc interpretation of the piece or that, forwhatever purpose,
he was inaccurately citing his intentions. But if the artist’s memory is veridical and if he is
reporting truthfully, then his interpretation is the surface interpretation, whatever the
critic thinks of that interpretation of the work. We will return to this point about surface
interpretation later.
Turning to the third focal aspect of the analogy between understanding action and
interpreting art, suppose that sitting in the audience during the performance of Firebird is
the steering committee for the rebellion. They are awaiting a signal to start the revolution
and they take Stravinski’s sudden downward motion of his arm as that signal. The
revolution to free humankind from economic oppression begins. Stravinski, let us further
suppose, knows nothing of the rebellion nor that he is the person to give the signal. The
steering committee brought to the situation a set of background beliefs, a theoretical or
conceptual framework, which is wholly distinct from Stravinski’s. For Stravinski, the
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start of the rebellion is an unknown and unintended consequence of his action of signaling
to the cellos.
A work of art may be interpreted in a way in which the artist never intended, nor even
imagined. A Greek tragedy or a Shakespearian play might be given a Freudian interpreta-
tion despite neither Euripides nor Shakespeare having knowledge of Freudian theory.
Eighteenth-century neoclassical painting might be interpreted from a feminist perspective
despite the lack of knowledge of feminism by David and his contemporaries. Just as an
agent need not – indeed, cannot – have knowledge about all the consequences of his actions
and the contexts in which they can be understood, so too an artist can lack knowledge about
the contexts and frameworks in which his work can be interpreted.
Sometimes an agent can foresee the consequences of her action even though that result is
not intended. In saving the life of a drowning child, a person might realize that she will
embarrass the lifeguard. She foresees that embarrassing the lifeguard is a consequence of
her action; but in acting as she did, she did not intend to embarrass him, she only intended
to save the child. The agent’s recognizing that embarrassing the lifeguard is a consequence
of her action puts her in the same position as an observer of what happened. An observer is
equally able as the actor herself to determine whether the action leads to the lifeguard being
embarrassed. The agent enjoys no privileged position with respect to understanding the
unintended consequences of her actions.
Similarly, an artist might offer an interpretation of his work in a context distinct from
that which he intended when creating the work. After creating the painting, our ﬁrst artist,
the one who intended to undertake an exercise in color and composition, might then
interpret the work as a symbol for an impending holocaust. Here he is offering a deep
interpretation of that piece; and the plausibility of his interpretation is only as strong as it
would be if it were offered by any observer. Since this interpretation does not reﬂect the
initial intentions with which he created the work, he fails to enjoy a privileged position.
Note, incidentally, the second artist, the one who created the work with the intention of
representing the coming holocaust, is in a privileged position with respect to that
interpretation. For the second artist, it is a surface interpretation; for the ﬁrst artist, it
is a deep interpretation.
The metaphor “surface interpretation” can be misleading. It suggests a superﬁcial or
minimalist interpretation. But a surface interpretation, taken as the artist’s intended
interpretation, can be both acute and robust. In creating the work, the artist might have a
comprehensive set of intentions, based on a highly articulated set of background beliefs,
which he successfully brings to fruition. True, many artists do not create in this way; but
there is little doubt that sometimes works exemplify an artist’s robust intentions.
2 The Dependency Theses
Danto claims, as we noted at the outset, that deep interpretation depends on surface
interpretation. There are several ways to understand this dependency. One is based on the
analogy with action theory, and elucidates Danto’s characteristic position on the nature of
art. Two others relate the contents of surface and deep interpretation.
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The ﬁrst claim of dependency – let us call it the Constitutive Dependency thesis – relies
onDanto’s view that interpretation is a function that transforms objects intoworks of art. In
order to understand the consequences of what a person does within some broad-based
context, the person’s bodily movements must rise to the status of action in virtue of their
causal history. Similarly, a physical object or event must be transﬁgured into a work of
art through the causal history of the artist’s intentions in order to be something that can
then be interpreted within a conceptual or theoretical context. We might symbolize this
claim by
IðoÞ ¼ W ;
where o ranges over material objects or events and W over works of art. There would be
no works of art unless there were interpretations (I) of objects and events.
We propose that there are two senses of “surface interpretation.” The ﬁrst equates a
surface interpretation with the artist’s intended interpretation:
ðSI1Þ The surface interpretation of a work of art is the artist’s intended interpretation:
The Constitutive Dependency thesis assumes that an artist’s intended surface interpreta-
tion is “correct” since “artworks are misconstituted when the surface interpretation is
wrong.”12
The second version adds that a surface interpretation is a minimal disambiguation of the
work:
ðSI2Þ A surface interpretation of a work of art is an interpretation that minimally
disambiguates the work consistent with the artist’s intentions and historical and
contextual background information:
Note that there can be indeﬁnitely many interpretative statements of the work consistent
with the historical and contextual information.
We believe that (SI1) best captures the spirit of Danto’s own view, as well as being the
more plausible alternative. As mentioned, the version (SI2) leads down a slippery slope
toward collapsing surface interpretation into deep interpretation.
Turning to deep interpretation,
ðDIÞ A deep interpretation of a work of art is an interpretation of that work;
other than a report of the artist’s intentions; that is grounded in some
theoretical or conceptual framework:
Note that in deep interpretation, the object of interpretation is a work of art, and not a mere
material object. The conceptual or theoretical framework within which a deep interpreta-
tion is made, according to (DI), need not be the artist’s framework.13
In addition to Constitutive Dependency, there is another type of dependency relation-
ship between deep and surface interpretation which we will call Content Dependency. In
order to assert that a deep interpretation is correct, the content of the deep interpretation
must bear a speciﬁc type of relationship to the content of the surface interpretation. At least
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two such instances of this relationship are distinguishable.We believe that Danto advocates
the weaker of these:
ðWeak DÞ A deep interpretation of a work of art is correct only if the deep
interpretation of the work is consistent with the surface interpretation
of the work:
Recall that the surface interpretation is most plausibly taken to be the artist’s intended
interpretation (SI1). Thus, a deep interpretation of a work of art is correct only if this
deep interpretation is consistent with the artist’s intended interpretation.
This condition for correctness of a deep interpretation is permissive, but it does not say
that every deep interpretation is correct. For example, Shakespeare did not ground his
work within the Freudian theoretical framework for the simple reason that he had no access
to this theory. Yet, it is plausible to think that none of Shakespeare’s beliefs in writing
Macbeth were incompatible with Freudian theory.14
This weak relationship between the contents of deep and surface interpretation
precludes a deep interpretation from being correct if it contradicts the artist’s intended
interpretation. In our earlier example, we supposed that an artist intended his orange
and yellow painting to symbolize the destruction of the ecosystem by humankind. If a
critic interpreted that work as symbolizing instead the gloriﬁcation of the ecosystem,
the critic would be incorrect. According to (Weak D), the artist, in some cases, is the ﬁnal
judge of incorrect deep interpretations of his work, though in no case is he the ﬁnal judge of
correct deep interpretations.
A stronger version of the Content Dependency thesis essentially restricts correct deep
interpretation to traditional art history:
ðStrong DÞ A deep interpretation of a work of art is correct only if the
deep interpretation of the work is consistent with the surface
interpretation and the deep interpretation is based on the
artist’s theoretical or conceptual framework:
Adeep interpretation, under this construal, seeks to understand the artwork by uncovering
connections between it and other works in the same tradition, by tracing the artist’s
intellectual development that led to his creating this particular piece, and so on. Here
only deep interpretations conducted within the context of traditional art history can be
correct. A Freudian interpretation ofMacbeth, for instance, would be automatically ruled
incorrect.
This condition of correctness ﬂies in the face of much contemporary literary and
artistic deep interpretation. InThe Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art, Danto appears
to want to defend this condition of correctness, but he cannot ﬁnd a good argument to do
so.15 It is an unpermissive thesis, though it does not reduce correct deep interpretations
to one.
Conceivably, one could hold that there is exactly one correct deep interpretation and this
is the artist’s intended interpretation, that is, that deep interpretation reduces to surface
interpretation. But this surely is false. There is no good reason to think that the statements
of the artist’s intentions and beliefs about the work of art exhaust all that is true of it.
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Philosophical interest liesmostly in theWeakDependency thesis, and secondarily in the
strong version.16 Each of them sets the limits on correct deep interpretations. Each of them
assigns a pivotal role to the artist’s intended interpretation. Theweak version is permissive,
though it does count some deep interpretations as incorrect. The strong version is
unpermissive, likely too much so.
3 Are Deep Interpretations Weakly Dependent on
Surface Interpretations?
We have proposed that it is likely that Danto advocates the weaker version of the Content
Dependency claim, (Weak D), which states that a deep interpretation that is inconsistent
with the surface interpretation is incorrect. In the interest of seeking correct interpretations
of artworks, it would seem to follow from advocating (Weak D) that Danto would be a
strong proponent of critics attending to artists’ intentions, for to do otherwise is to risk both
viewers’ understanding of the work and the status of the object as art. But is this, in fact,
what Danto advocates?
AlthoughDanto does not address this question directly in his philosophical writings, we
have the opportunity to study his art critical writings for an answer. In his reviews (written
for The Nation), Danto provides a glimpse into the practice of interpreting that he only
suggests as a philosopher. Thoughmost of his reviews serve to reinforce theWeak Content
Dependency thesis, some do not.17 In these latter examples, Danto offers deep inter-
pretations, the content of which is clearly inconsistent with the content of the artists’
intended surface interpretations.
Consider ﬁrst the case of Anselm Kiefer, a native of Germany, who creates paintings
(somemeasuring 12 by 18 feet) that consist of photos, pigment, lead, sand, and straw. Over
the past 20 years, his subject matter has ranged from vast and desolate landscapes of
destruction, to architectural interiors reminiscent of Nazi design, to mythological refer-
ences to Nordic, Egyptian, German, and Old Testament narratives, and, most recently, to
symbolic representations of science as redemptive knowledge. His works are heavily laden
with allusions to history, philosophy, alchemy, and poetry, so much so that on a deep level
(according to Danto) they are indecipherable without a catalogue that is “obligingly
provided” to visitors by the museum staff. The catalogue, in fact, becomes the focus of our
discussion; it is the locus of Kiefer’s stated surface interpretations, interpretations that
Danto, as critic, rejects.
Kiefer, in describing early works such as The Flooding of Heidelberg (1969),Nero Paints
(1974), and Painting ¼ Burning (1974), has incited considerable controversy: “I do not
identify with Nero or Hitler . . . but I have to reenact what they did just a little bit in order to
understand the madness. That is why I make these attempts to become a fascist.”18 Mark
Rosenthal, the author of the catalogue, places this remark in a larger framework of other
claims by Kiefer in order to discern a cohesive rationale to Kiefer’s intended meanings.
Rosenthal’s deep interpretations of Kiefer’s work – which see Kiefer as exploring complex
themes of life and death, good and evil, artist as salvation of theGerman people versus artist
as destructive power – are based on extensive interviews with the artist.19 When Kiefer
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refers to Adolf Hitler in Nuremburg (1982) or the Aryan woman of Paul Celan’s poetry20
(Your Golden Hair, Margarete, 1981) or Germany’s Spiritual Heroes (1973), Rosenthal
believes that Kiefer is “derisively parroting the fondly held views of Germany,”21 namely,
thatGermany exempliﬁes a pure and superior race: “Kiefer’s outlook is founded on a notion
that is akin to original sin: a ‘blemish’ exists on the soul of humanity, especially the German
nation, and this is very nearly impossible to remove.”22 Any artist – and the artist Kiefer
in particular – “is dangerous yet important to society.”23 Kiefer sees himself in the role of
the dangerous artist who portrays the horrors perpetrated by a Germany that has
“maimed itself and its civilization by destroying its Jewish members” in his attempt to
“makeGermanywhole again.”24 Kiefer exposes rather than ignores the past, haunting his
countrymen with scenes of desolation, despair, and evil in an attempt to force them to
atone for the past. “A state of spiritual anxiety prevails; perhaps a form of chaos is
immanent.”25 Rosenthal reports: “Kiefer is uncomfortable when his art is positive or
perceived to be so, for he believes that this attribute is not sensible or realistic given
history and the present world situation.”26
Danto’s reading of thework, however, stands in sharp contrast toKiefer’s claims.Danto
believes that Kiefer is deluding enthusiastic fans (especially wealthy Jewish patrons) with a
“crackpot message” of German nationalism totally devoid of remorse and shame.27
Rosenthal’s catalogue is a “morass of portentous exegesis” designed to explain the “farce
of heavy symbolism” abundant in Kiefer’s works. Kiefer’s use of symbols is “jejune and
dishonest,” an “absurdmasquerade . . . a heavy-handed compost of shallow ideas and foggy
beliefs.” Kiefer is deliberately deceiving us by means of ambiguous imagery, skillfully
crafted to be taken in either of two ways:
The work is willfully obscure enough that it can be interpreted that way [as Deutschland’s
contrition over the Holocaust], and sufﬁciently ﬁlled with ﬂames, ruins, charred stumps and
slurried wastes that one can see agony and the ashes of slaughtered innocents inscribed in its
dreary surfaces. But it is far more plausible that it is a sustained visual lament for a shattered
Vaterland, a recall to the myths of triumph and heroic will and a summons to fulﬁllment of
some Nordic promise as if the comfortable German present must be shaken out of its
commercial complacencies and prodded into some serious game of dungeons and dragons
through which it will regain its destiny.
When Danto offers his own “more plausible” reading of Kiefer’s work, he is, in effect,
offering a deep interpretation whose content clearly contradicts the content of the
artist’s intended surface interpretation. Danto rejects Kiefer as arbiter of the meaning
of the works and instead sets himself up as ﬁnal judge.
Consider another example: the work of New York artist Julian Schnabel. Schnabel’s
canvases are, like Kiefer’s, large and three dimensional. He has depicted human ﬁgures on
black velvet as inNicknames ofMaitre d’s (1984), fairytale characters on linoleum inHumpty
Dumpty (1984), and introduced his “signature” use of broken plates aﬁxed to painted
canvas in The Walk Home (1985).28 His work was the hotly debated and bestselling
commodity of the 1980s artworld. In contrast to Kiefer, Schnabel has written extensively
about his work, explaining his paintings in an attempt to prevent critics from usurping his
role as interpreter. Schnabel claims that his work is a way to share his thoughts and
78 S U R F A C E A N D D E E P I N T E R P R E T A T I O N
experiences with others in order to relay “a clearer realization of the world we live in.”29
“Only through the work can there be a recognition, a harmony of intention and revelation,
artist and viewer communing.”Bymeans of this sharing, art is generative: “All components
of the work are parts of a desire to transform the spirit.” “We are then using the physical to
get at the invisible communal which is about the sameness of the viewer and the artist, not
about their difference.” It is not created for the “cliques of power” (“Art that caters to critics
is empty”) nor is their input welcome.
There is altogether toomuchmediating going on; toomanywords and ideas and theories come
between the viewer and the object of contemplation. On the spot digestion and
“interpretation” of a work of art by a critic/reporter, quick and witty reportage, serves to
obfuscate meaning.
Take the use of broken plates as an example: “My interest was in the reﬂective property of
white plates to disturb the picture plane . . . The plates seemed to have a sound of every
violent human tragedy, an anthropomorphic sense of things being smeared and thrown.”
According to Danto, however, the plates give the paintings “a vitality all the whipped
pigment and portentous imagery aspire to but miss.”30 Danto accepts none of Schnabel’s
claims. He casts him as the paradigm mercenary: a cuckold of critics. Schnabel paints big
paintings because the market disdains small ones (“If you do not make it big, you do not
make it at all.”) Schnabel slathers on the paint because it “enables the artist to deposit
evidence of creative frenzy.” He depicts the human ﬁgure (for example, a yellow female
Christ on a cross in Vita, 1984) because it is serious in tone (Christ) and timely (female).
The ﬁgure is badly drawn “just to make it clear that feeling trumps dexterity.” His works
are “so anxious to please that it is as though they are wagging their tails.” He has “so
ingeniously internalized” the “crass structures of the art world” that his “loud and awful
paintings” serve as “fuel for the engines of the art market today.”
This is a cursory dismissal of Schnabel’s explicitly stated surface intentions. At least in
the case of Kiefer, Danto admitted that the images were ambiguous and could be read in
opposing ways. But in the case of Schnabel, Danto rejects the artist’s intentions outright.
In sum, (WeakD), the requirement of consistency between a deep interpretation and the
surface interpretation, is defeated by counterexamples from Danto’s own writings in art
criticism. Danto offers deep interpretations of both Kiefer’s and Schnabel’s works that are
contrary to reports of their intended interpretations. Presuming that Danto’s deep
interpretations are correct, it is possible, then, for a deep interpretation to contradict an
artist’s intended interpretation.
Danto might respond that neither Kiefer nor Schnabel accurately report their intended
interpretations. Once we know what their actual intentions are, the alleged inconsistencies
would dissolve. However, we have good evidence in these cases about the artist’s
intentions; indeed, in terms of documented reports of artists’ intentions, if these cases
fail, it is unclear whether we can establish any genuine surface interpretations.
Moreover, even if Danto is correct in claiming that Kiefer and Schnabel have mis-
reported their intentions, we can assume for the sake of argument that theywere accurate in
their reports. We would presume that, even in these counterfactual circumstances, Danto
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would continue to argue for the correctness of his deep interpretations. As critic, Danto
takes the approach that he has insight into these works, independently of what the artists
intended to create.
Note that the analogy with human action does not require consistency between the
content of surface and deep interpretations. The consequences of an action can be
understood by an observer in ways incompatible with the agent’s intended consequences,
provided that the observer’s theoretical framework differs appropriately from the agent’s.
A Marxist, for example, might well understand a neoconservative legislator’s decision to
cut taxes for the wealthy entirely differently from the consequences intended by the
legislator.Thus, dependency between the contents of surface and deep interpretation is not
supported by the analogy with human action.
4 Consequences for the Constitutive Dependency Thesis
Let us agree that these counterexamples to (WeakD) obtain, that there are cases inwhich the
critic’s, not the artist’s, interpretation is correct. This result has consequences for Danto’s
primary philosophical claim about the nature of art, his Constitutive Dependency thesis.
Recall Danto’s claim that interpretation is constitutive: “an object is an artwork at all
only in relation to an interpretation.” Danto stipulated, further, that the correct surface
interpretation is the one with which the artist does (or could) agree. That is, the correct
surface interpretation – the interpretation constitutive of the artwork –must coincide with
the artist’s own description or mental representation of the work. The Constitutive
Dependency thesis, moreover, is grounded on the analogy with human action. The
consequences of an action can be understood only if an action has in fact been performed,
and an action has been performed only if the agent’s intentions caused his bodily
movements. Similarly, there can be a deep interpretation of a work of art only if there
is in fact a work of art, and there is a work of art only if there is an interpretation of what has
been created in terms of the artist’s intentions.
However, counterexamples to (Weak D) also jeopardize the Constitutive Dependency
thesis, for artworks are “misconstituted when interpretation is wrong.”31 If the artist’s
intended surface interpretation can be rejected by the critic, then these man-made objects
can fail to be transﬁgured into art. The status of the artwork as an object that embodies the
artist’s creative intentions loses its focal position. It is as if the causal role of an agent’s
intentions were not essential to his actions. Basically, this result collapses the distinction
between action and mere behavior, as it collapses the distinction between works of art and
ordinary objects and events.
Fortunately, this problem is not as serious as might be supposed. The confusion, we
suggest, is to take surface and deep interpretations to be competing. This confusion is
compounded by talk of each kind of interpretation being correct or incorrect. If (WeakD) is
defeated, and the critic’s interpretation can contradict the artist’s intended interpretation,
and moreover the critic’s interpretation is taken to be correct, then it is natural to conclude
that the artist’s intended interpretation is incorrect. But drawing this “natural” conclusion
must be rejected.
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Rather, we suggest that “correct” and “incorrect” not be predicated of surface
interpretations (or, if they are, these terms be deﬁned in a way different from the way
they are used in the case of deep interpretations). Surface interpretations are sets of
statements that accurately reﬂect, or fail to accurately reﬂect, the artist’s intentions in
creating thework. Surface interpretations refer primarily to the artist’s intentions, and only
secondarily to the work. By contrast, deep interpretations are readings of the work within a
theoretical or conceptual framework; they make reference to the artist’s intentions, at best,
secondarily if they refer to them at all.
The normative terms “accurate” and “inaccurate” should replace “correct” and
“incorrect” in the case of surface interpretation. An accurate surface interpretation is a set
of true statements that describes the artist’s intentions in creating the work. An inaccurate
surface interpretation does the opposite. We suppose, further, that some descriptions
capturebetter thanothers theartist’s intentions; that is, statementsof surface interpretations
lie on a continuum, with some being more inaccurate than others. An accurate surface
interpretation is one that describes best the artist’s intentions in creating the work.
The Constitutive Dependency thesis now says that an object or event is transﬁgured
into an artwork if there is an accurate surface interpretation of that object or event.Note that
it is not claimed that the surface interpretation must be known by anyone other than the
artist. Rather, the claim is only that there is such an interpretation for there to be an artwork.
An accurate surface interpretation can contradict a correct deep interpretation. The
correctness of a deep interpretation depends on a variety of factors, some of which are
obvious – such as internal consistency, grounding in a conceptual framework – and
others of which are far from obvious. But, in any case, correct deep interpretations do
not necessarily depend on statements of the artist’s intentions. Understood in this way,
statements of Kiefer’s and Schnabel’s intentions can be accurate, and Danto’s deep
interpretations of their works can be correct, while simultaneously contradicting
each other.
Reformulating the Constitutive Dependency thesis in terms of an accurate rendering of
the artist’s intentions is consistent with the analogy with human action.Danto’s main point
that creating a work of art is like performing an action remains because in both cases the
agent does something that satisﬁes his intentions. Moreover, in both cases, he has special
access to these representational states. This approach to the Constitutive Dependency
thesis is within the spirit of Danto’s view; even if it departs somewhat from the letter of it.
In conclusion, the Dependency thesis (Weak D), which requires consistency between
the contents of surface and deep interpretations, is false, as counterexamples derived from
Danto’s own art-critical writings show. A consequence of the failure of (Weak D) is a high
level of permissiveness for correct deep interpretations. We may be more skilled at the
deep level than Danto gives us credit. At one point, Danto laments that he has not found
an argument to constrain deep interpretations. The reason that he has not found one, we
maintain, is that there is no good argument. Without (Weak D), it is difﬁcult to rule out
myriad, perhaps even bizarre, deep interpretations. But so be it.
The failure of (Weak D) might seem to threaten the Constitutive Dependency thesis,
the central claim of Danto’s theory of art. But not so. The apparent inconsistency between
some surface interpretations and other correct deep interpretations disappears when we
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realize that surface interpretations are to be evaluated on the basis of their accurately
describing the artist’s intentions, and not the work itself, whereas deep interpretations are
evaluated on just the opposite basis. The Constitutive Dependency thesis, when taken to
mean that there is a work of art if there is an accurate surface interpretation of the object,
remains tenable.
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